A dynamic equilibrium model is constructed to analyze the implications of different degrees of central bank independence. In the main model, each period agents are pennitted to vote on the desired inflation and labor taxes in order to finance a specified level of government spending. In this case multiple perfect-foresight equilibria arise, which depend on the initial conditions of the economy. It is shown that agents will choose to levy only one tax at a tirne, rather than selecting some version of a "tax-smoothing" policy. One of these equilibda display cycles which exhibit fluctuations in output, investment, and the in{lation rates as a result of permitting agents to vote. If instead of having agents vote each period on these parameters, inflation and labor taxes in the model axe set at fixed levels, these fluctuations do not appear.
INTRODUCTION
There has been a considerable and persistent debate in many countries concerning the optimal degree of independence which should be provided for the overseers in control of monetary potcy on the one hand, and the alternative branches of government on t]le other.
The current paper presents a very simple dynamic general equilibrium framework in which this issue can be studied. In particular, it is shown that if agents can vote each period on the optimal level of money creation, which is interpreted as an extreme version of the absence of central bank independence, the resulting equilibrium of the economy may be one in which the inflation rate, as well as other economic aggregates, display persistent fluctuations, and there is a relatively h)gh average level inflation. This might be interpreted to mean that letting the legislative branch of government control monetary policy could be bad in that it would lead to a great deal of aggregate volatility. This is potentially an important development because, to date, there are very few dynamic general equilibrium optimizing models which seek to analyze the impact of central bank independence. It is also shown tlat this economy can display multiple equilibria, with some of these equilibria exhibiting limiting cycles, and some without cycles. Different initial conditions, or fully anticipated exogenous shocks are shown to be able to cause these cyclical equilibria to arise.
In many developing and advanced countries, it seems that there is a continuing debate as to how they should structure their central banks so as to Provide the "optimal" monetary policy to fucilitate the attaining the highest possible welfare for the citizens of the country.
Proponents of central bank independence cite the empirical analyses of this issue which appear to find that more independent cenfial banks tend, on average, to have lower rates of inflation (see Bade and Parkin (1982) , and Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992)).t However, because of the computational or analy.tical complexities involved, it has been very difficult to construct models that are able to analyze this question. In this paper a very simple model of the impact of central bank independence, or lack tlereof, is presented.
The goal of this paper, however, is not to analyze the choices that individuals will make in constructing their governmental institutions since tlis would seem to be a formidable task.
Rather, the goal is to characterize tle behavior of an economy under alternative institutional arrangements so that imight can be gained concerning the comparative dynamic effects of these different arrangements.-There has been a great deal of related work done recently in which the government policies are determined endogenously, in a similar spirit to that studied below. Tabellini (1991) studies the behavior of government debt in an economy in which policies are determined by majority rule. Tabellini and Alesina (1990) study an economy in which agents vote on the composition of government spending. Alesina (1988) provides a detailed set of references to this growing literature.2 Cukierman (1992) presents a rigorous analysis of the issues involved in studying and modelling central bank independence, From an empirical perspective, Bade and Parkin (1982) , and Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) also provide a detailed analysis of the apparent empirical relationship between the apparent independence of central banks in various countries, and the tendency for these same economies to experience low rates of inflation.3
One goal of this paper is to illustrate the importance of analyzing the impact that the political structure can have on ttre behavior of a dynamic economy. An economy in which policy parameters are fixed according to some socially optimal criterion can behave vet] different from the s:rme economy in which a mechanism exists to permit economic agents to endogenously choose the level of these pararreters. In this latter instance, important considerations such as the distribution of wealth may influence the level of the policy parameters, which in turn can then influence the future distribution of wealth and the level of these policy parameters. As is shown below, this can then produce economic behavior that would notbe present in the absence of the endogenous policy formulation. Therefore, this analysis is a step in the direction of linking the normative and positive analyses of government policies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section the physical and political structure of this very simple economy is described in detail. The economy is inhabited by a population of overlapping generations, each of whom lives for three periods only. Agents work in their first two periods of life, and invest in capital for tle last two periods. There is.a reserve requirement imposed on all such investment so that some fraction of investment must take the form of holding government issued fiat currency.
Each period the government must finance a fixed level of real expenditures' In the benchmark model, at each date agents vote on the appropriate levels of labor taxation and the inflation tax, and it is assumed that the majority determines the levels of these paramerefs.
In Section III a series of exarrples are presented. It is shown that tlere can exist multiple steady-state equilibri4 which depend on the initial conditions of the economy. The implications for the level of investment and output are studied. It is shown that in one of the equilibria the inflation tax can fluctuate dramatfually in the model, with the agents collectively voting to use the labor tax" or the inflation tax, but never both. This provides some motivation for why one might expect tle antithesis of the usual tax smoothing behavior. It is also shown how perfectly-foreseen temporary exogenous disturbances can have persistent and permanent effects on the equilibrium, and on the endogenous policy variables. In the other equilibrium there are no such fluctuations, and the agents choose to finance government spending through a labor tax instead. This can also be interpreted as an equilibrium in which the central bank policy is to minimize ilflation, and therefore there is no endogenous policy formulation. Section fV contains some final temarls.
il. THE ECONOMIC EI{VIRONMENT AND THE EQUILIBRJUM
The economy is one in which time is discrete and is indexed by t = 1,2,... Each period there is a generation of agents of size N who enter the economy, and are present there for three periods. For convenience it will be assumed that N=1. An agent who enters the economy in period t will be said to be a member of generation ! and is present in the economy in periods t, t+ 1, and t+2. Agents have perfect foresigltl concerntng the fufure.
Each member of generation t wishes to consume some of the single consumption good in period t+1, and t+2. That is to say, they do not consume in the first period of life.
Agents have one unit of labor effort to supply inelastically in period t and in t+1, and which will produce wr., and wr,*, units of the consumption good in periods t and tf 1 respectively. These wages are measured in units of the consumption good.
There is a productive capital (or storage) technolory in the economy that can be used to transfer the consumption good from one period to the next. This technology is operated by a single financial intermediary.a The technolory is constant returns to scale, so that in any period t, one unit of the consumption good can be invested so that it will yield 4*, (> 1) units of the consumption good in period t+1, which can then be consumed.
Agents who are members of generation t will wish to consume in future periods, and can do so by investing in the intermediary in that period. Tte intennediary, however, faces a governrnent-imposed reserve requirement on ttrese deposits. For each deposit made in the intermediary, it must hold a proportion of (c) units in the form of fiat currency, which has been issued by the governmen! and ttre remaining (1-a) units are ttren invested in capital.
Hence individual agents hold the title to assets of financial intermediaries. Only the intermediaries hold tle currency and the agents hold curreng/ through the intermediary.s Let M, then denote the aggregate supply of fiat currency at the begindng of period t, and let p, denote tle price of the consumption good in units of cuffency in period t. In the regimes considered below, at the beginning of each period t, the rate of money supply growth for ttrat period will be denoted ns pr+r = (M,*, -M)M. The government can change the money supply in order to finance government consumption. With this information in mind, the gross rate of return to deposits with the intermediary in period t is then r,*, = (1-c)x,*, + a(p,/p,*r). That is, the gross rate of return to capital is a linear combination of the rates of return to capital and ttrat of money. Now obviously the government can use inflation as a levy on capital. Therefore, this will then be referred to as the inflation tax, and henceforth the inflation rate will be denoted by rr,*r = (p,*,/p,) -lj A member of generation t has a utility function that will be described as follows
where c*, represenls consumption by an agent in period t who is currently in period s of his life. Of course, (1/p) is meant to measure the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption for an agen! and p>0, p*1.7 In period t each member of generation t supplies their unit of labor inelastically. The agent has his labor income taxed at a rate rt,.
The agent will then invest tle remaining income, so that the period t budget constraint for such an agent is then kr,, = wr"(l-rt,).
Here (,*, represents the investuent in capital purchased in period t by an agen! who is currently in period (s-1) of his life, and which is then taken into period t+1.
A member of generation t who enters period t+1 with kz,rr units of capital then collects the refurn on this investrrent, in units of the consumption good, in the amount of r,*, pet unit of capital. This divisible return oD investment can be consumed, and investment for the future periods can also then be undertaken. The amount of this investment is denoted by k .,*r. The agent also inelastically supplies his unit of labor, and collects wage income of w",*, and pays taxes on this income at ttre rate ol rt rrr.a Hence, his second period budget constraint can then be written as follows c7,.1 = (k4ar,,,) * w.,-,il -'l') -kr,,n'
In the last period of ttre agent's life, he will consume the total value of his after tax capital holdings, since he is not able to work. His budget constraiDt for this period is then written as follows
Aggregate output is then measured as t&e quantity of goods created in a period by both factors, labor and capital, and is written ase Y, = (1 -d)(kr,, kt.,)r, * (wr., * wr,).
The second part of this expression reflects labor income, and the first part reflects the output prodnced through from saving, of which'(l-c) is the fraction actually invested in capital. The tax rate that appears in the budget constraints (rt, ), as well as the inflation rate (2,), have yet to be determined. Although the agents will later take these parameters as given, it is assumed that at ttre beginning of every period q the members of generation t-2, t-1, and t vote on the size of these policy variables. It is also assumed that these parameters cannot be negative. After these policy variables are determined, the agents maximize utility subject to their budget constraints while acting as pdce takers, and taking as given the behavior of other agents, including the behavior of future generations.
Since money is held as a resewe requirement in the financial intermediary it is necessarily the case rhat the following equilibrium condition be satisfiedl0 M u(kz, * kr.,) = ;.
(1)
In any period t the governmetrt must spend G, units of the consumption good on its own consumption. This must be financed by utilizing the labor tax, or the inflation tax, or some combination of both. Hence the government budget constraint can then be written as follows f",l G, = a(k,,. o,,r[+l * (w,., + w",)te,.
The first component of this expression is the tax base for the inflation tax, multiplied by the inflation tax rate. The second component is the revenue derived from labor taxation. It is now instructive to begin with the analysis of the optimization problem faced by a member of generation t-1. Such an agent must maximize the utility function, as given by For convenience this value function is written as a function of the variables (rr,, r,) ttrat are chosen at the beginning of period ! since t,*, = (1-c)&*, + al(L+tr,). However, it should be clear that this value function is also dependent on the levels of the contemporaneous labor income, the capital stock, retum to capital, and additionally, the levels of future poltcy variables. The agent who is a member of generation t-1 must maximize equation (5) zubject to equation (2), subject to the constraints tlat tt, r', 2 0. Now, substitution of a version of equation (2) into equation (5) yields a value function for members of generation t-1, at the beginning of period t, which is a function of the labor tax rate (rc,) and the inflation rate (2,).
The voting behavior of most of tle population is easily descnbed. The young agents in any period will choose to have all government spending financed by the inflation tax since they hold no capital, and their sole source of income is derived from their labor, The old agents will in turn choose the opposite: they will want to have only a labor tax since they earn no labor income but instead hold only capital. Hence, the determination of the equilibrium tax rates will then be made by the middle-aged agents. These middle-aged agents then will prefer the values of (zt,) and (zr,) which maximize tleir value function (5) zubject to the govertrment budget constraint (2).1r
It is assumed that when agents make their voting decisions, ttrey are playing a Nash game against future generations. That is, they choose (2r,, zr',) while taking as given the voting behavior and investment decisions of other agents in present and future generations.
Clearly there is no uncertainty or incomplete inforrration about the behavior of other agents since this is an economy of perfect foresight. After having voted and detennined the equilibrium tax rates, they act as price takers when making their consumption and investment decisions.
To make the specification of tle equitbrium nature of the economy more formal, it may be useful to proceed with the following definition.
Definition: A Perfect Foresight Compefirtve Equilibriam for this economy is a collection of non-negative sequences {4, G,, w', wzn kauu k:,,-r, ca, cr,., or, r'. }!=,, such that for t>1, the following conditions are satisfied:
i) For members of generation t-L, given tle levels of {+, G", wlsr w23, k,., k,", ,r,*1, ?d"*1)-,=,, the period t parameters 1tr,, r2,) are chosen to maximize the value function as given by equation (5), subject to the government's budget constraint (2).
ii) Given the policy parameters (a,, rr,), tle return to capital (r,, r,*), and endowments (wr,n wa,), the quantities (kzo kr,o can e.,) maximize the utility function, subject to the budget constraints. This implies the decision rules descnibed by equation (4) are satisfied.
iiD The government budget constraint (2) holds for each period.
tq
The money market equilibrium condition (1) is satisfied in each period.
The specification of the equilibrium is somewhat complex, since the agents are taking the contemporaneous state variables, as well as future choice variables as given when making their voting decisions. Subsequently, they act as price takers when making their consumption and savings decisions. It is possible to analytically characterize the behavior of the value function (5) as the parameters zr, and t2, are varied, but this turns out not to be a very instructive exercise. Rather than proceed with an analysis of this sort in this somewhat general setup, it will be much more instructive to examine a few examples, and this is done in the following section.
ru. SAMPLE ECONOMIES
At this point it will be illustrative to explore the dynamic behavior of the model. Although some analytical characterization of the solution can be performed, this does not adequately or easily lead to an understanding of the dynamic behavior of the economy. In spite the relative simplicity of the economy, this difficulty is due to the choices available to agents, and due to the infinite horizon of the economy. Instead, it would appear to be more The reason why these fluctuation occur is as follows. Inherent in the decision to be made by the niddle-aged agents is a consideration of the level of government consumption to be financed and tax burden to be levied, and the way that agents can minimize their welfare loss from these taxes. In the first period the oldest agents axe relatively rich in capital, and consequently the middle-aged agents wish to have capital taxed through the inflation tax, and not to tax labor at all. Since ttre labor income of tle young in period f. is then not taxed, these latter agents are relatively capital-rich in period 2, and therefore they vote to tax labor in this period -the reverse of what happened in period 1. This behavior subsequently repeats itself every two periods after ttris.
In each period the middle-aged agents weigh the relative (utility) costs imposed by levying the labor and inflation taxes. These same agents are susceptible to paying both taxes if they hold any capital, and so it seems natural that they would choose to vote for the tax that maximizes their welfare.l3 Although the levels of wr., and kr,, do not directly affect the decisions of a member of generation t-1, since they are not a component of his wealth, these variables do influence the voting behavior of these agents indirectly. The higher are these variables, the greater tle capabilities to a member of generation t-l of minimizing his own tax burden by foisting it instead on the nembers of either the older or younger generations. For exanple, the higher (lower) is q,, relative to w.,, and the lower (higher) is k,, relative to k ,, tle more (less) likely it will be that the member of generation t-L will vote in period t to tax labor (capital).
It should also be stated that in tle absence of positive government spending, there would not be any fluctuations for this economy, and instead there would be a single stationary equilibrium. Similarly, it can easily be seen that the magnitude of the present fluctuations are closely related to the size of the level of governnent spending. That is, the higher the level of G,, the greater is the magnitude of the fluctuations.
Exarnple #2:
This example is exactly the same as in the previous one except that the initial conditions are different. In tlis case kr, = 18, and kt,,, --17. The resulting paths for tle capital stocks are shown in Figure 3 . In the initial period the middle-aged agents are capital-rich, and therefore they choose to have labor taxed in period L, rather than choose the inflation tax as in tle previous example. In the subsequent period, the old agents are still not sufficiently capital-rich to convince the middle-aged agents to choose a high level of inflation, and therefore a labor tax is employed again. This behavior continues forever, with a labor tax rate of 5Vo beng implemented in every period.
Obviously, the behavior of the economy in this example is identical to ttrat which would arise if there were a rule or law that mandated tlat all government spending be financed through the labor tax, and the inflation rate always be set to zero, irrespective of the initial conditions.ra Clearly the result from such a policy would be an equilibrium in which cycles do not appear in the level of output, capital stock, inflation rate, or the rate of return to capital. In light of tle behavior observed in Example #1 (and Example #3 below), it is possible to conclude that within a choice-theoretic general equilibrium model, removing all forms of central bank independence can potentially lead to higher average rates of inflation, as well as lluctuations in the inflation rate and other aggregates, than would otherwise be the case if central bank were left to pursue a strict zero inflation policy on its owll.
Example #3: This example is again exactly the same as the first one, with the exception of the initial conditions for the capital stock. In this instance k^, = 25, and k., = 20. The resulting path for the capital stocks is illustrated in Figure 4 . Obviously the result is that the model exhibits a cyclical equilibrium that appears to be identical to that in Example #1. However, this is not quite the case. In tle first example tle inflation tax is levied in odd periods, while the labor tax is imposed in even periods. In the present example, altlough tle cycles still exist, the opposite is tle case. The reason for this is that here the middle-aged agents begin period 1 witl relatively plenty of capital, and therefore choose to tax labor in this period. From then on the reasoning behind the cyclical 11 equilibrium is identical to that in the first example.
Example #4:
In this example, tJre economy is identical with that studied in Example #2, with the exception of a perfectly-foreseen labor productivity shock in period 1.0. In particular, the paraneterization of the economy is as follows: wr,ro = 21, and otherwise wr,, = *., = 20, Gt = 2, x,: 1.0S, p =2.0,a=.I0,F = .95. There are two initial values for the economy: ka1 = 18, and kr, : 17. The levels of labor income are constant, except for period 10, in which case there is a SVo increase in the labor income of the young agents. Figure 5 shows the paths for the capital stocks in this example, while Figure 6 shows the paths for the inflation and labor taxes. This example illustrates how an expected exogenous disturbance is capable of changing tle steady-state behavior of the economy, and moving the economy from the non-cyclic to t&e cyclical equilibrium. The reverse behavior is also possible in that an expected exogenous shock catr move the economy from the cyclic equilibrium to the non-cyclic equilibrium.
This example illushates the importance that voting, and therefore endogenous policy formulation, plays in the model. If the tax rates were fixed arbitrarily in this example, the economy, which began in a non-cyclic steady-state, would converge back to this steady-state a few periods after the temporary exogenous disturbance. The voting, or endogenous policy formuliation, is then critical in producing the observed fluctuations.
ry. FNAL REMARKS
It would seem indisputable that political considerations are an important factor that help determine how policy parameters are formulated witlin market economies. Yet there are relatively few dynamic models that have these parameters determined endogenously, with agents participating in tle political structure. It may not be clear a-priori, how incorporating these features into a dynamic economy will alter the behavior of the economy, but the previous analysis suggests that the changes produced can potentially be dramatic.
t2
The framework described above has shown that introducing majority voting into the determination of tax rates can also interject instability or fluctuations in various aggregates.
Agent's different levels of capital and labor income influence tleir preferences concerning the levels of labor and inflation taxes. This analysis has been conducted within a ftamework .in which the ftuctuations would not arise in the abselce of the voting on the levels ofthe policy parameters. Additionally, no externalities or "backward-bending" supply curues for saving were necessary ingredients in producing the cyclical equilibria. What is important in the present framework is the endogenous voting, and not the way that output is produced.
As has been emphasized by such as authors as Barro (1979) , it would seem appropriate that governments should pursue a type of tax-smoothing policy in order to minimize the intertemporal costs of distortional taxation. As shown here however, as well as in Huffoian (1993), tax smoothing is apparently not something that one might e4pect to naturally arise in environments in which agents, acting in their own private self-interest, can partially determine the policies that affect their decisions. 2. What is missing from much of the existing literature, and what is the main points of tle present paper, is an explanation of how policies implemented in one period influence the distribution of wealth in such a manner as to also influence tle policies tlat are chosen in future periods. AIso, much of this literature contains analyses of models which are finite horizon economies: The model studied in the present paper has an infinite horizon, and as such permits an analysis of how the endogenous variables evolve over time in reaction to various disturbances. Alesina and Spear (1988) use the werlapping generations model to construct a model of electoral competition. Boldrin (1993) , and Krusell and Rios-Rull (1993a, 1993b) study the impact that voting can have in models where factors of production can be accumulated. However, they do not address the possfoility of cyclical fluctuations as is the focus of the present paper.
3. Alesina and Summers (1993) point out that although there appears to be a negative relationship between the degtee of central bank independence and the average rate of inflation, there appears to be no such discernable relationship between the degree of independence and a measure of real economic performance.
4. One potential reason for this may be that there is a minimal investnent level that is necessary before any investnetrt returns a positive amount. This minimal investrnent level is then more tlan tle potential endowment of any single agent in the economy.
5, One could alternatively assume that the agents directly hold the cn ency as a reserve requirement against these deposits with the intermediary.
6. Of course, ttre issues of time-inconsistency are being avoided. However, it is not clear how or if these problems would arise within the context of a model in which policies are endogenously determined through voting.
7. Huffman (L993) studies a model in which p = 1, which is to say that utility is logarithmic, so that the agents investment decisions are independent of the equilibrium interest rate.
8. It would be relatively straightforward to incorporate an endogenous labor decision into the agents optimization problem by changing the first period utility function to [c, -(fr)']l-e, where d, is period t labor effort, and <o ) 1. However, addilg this feature would not appear to add anything substantive to tle curent analysis.
I7
9. Since N=1, there is no need here to distinguish between individual and aggregate quantities.
10. Since x, > 1, and n, > 0, the agents would never voluntarily hold money since the rate of return on money is dominated by that of capital.
11. It is also assumed that there is no mechanism that would permit agents at one date to commit to their votes in future dates. Obviously, allowing this would complicate the analysis by adding many more strategic considerations.
12. This may seem to be an extreme level of inflation, but this level can be made smaller or larger by changing the reserve requirement or the agent's discount factor.
L3. In Huftnan (1993) the capital stock is fixed and hence there is an endogenous price for capital. It is shown within this environnent that the value function of the middle-aged agents, as a function of the percentage of the government consumption financed through the two taxes, is convu. Naturally, in their voting the agents always choose corner solutions with either tle labor tax or a capital tax employed, but nevet both. In tle present case, preferences over taxes are single-peaked, but they always move to corner solutions.
L4. It is not necessarily tle case that tle non-cyclic equilibrium will always have the agents choosing the labor tax in each period. It depends upon tle relative sizes of capital and labor income available to middle-aged agents. The logic behind this result is perhaps best illustrated in Huffnan (1993). 
